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Why do regional security organizations choose different approaches to implementing global 
gender norms? To address this question, we examine how the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU) integrated requirements derived 
from UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on women, peace, and security 
into their security policies. We identify differences in scope and dynamics between the change 
processes in both organizations. The OSCE simply adapted its existing gender policy and has 
not changed it since, whereas the EU introduced a new, more comprehensive and specific 
policy, which it already has amended several times. Drawing on historical institutionalism and 
feminist institutionalism, we find that, first, reform coalitions prepared the ground for gender-
mainstreaming in the organizations’ respective security policies, and that, second, embedded 
policy structures, including rules and norms about external interaction as well as existing policy 
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Why do regional security organizations implement global gender norms and principles, and 
why do they use different approaches? The European Union (EU) and the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) are interesting cases that help us answer these 
questions. Both organizations have engaged with United Nations Security Council Resolution 
No. 1325 on women, peace, and security (UNSCR 1325), which was adopted on October 31, 
2000, and which urges UN member states and UN institutions to (1) increase women’s 
participation and (2) incorporate a gender perspective into all of their peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding activities at the national, regional, and international levels (UN Security Council, 
2000).i However, the EU’s and OSCE’s implementation approaches with respect to the 
resolution vary in scope and dynamic. The EU issued a comprehensive policy document and 
later added indicators to identify concrete steps to turn the policy into practice, whereas the 
OSCE responded with a comparatively short, not yet amended policy document that lacks 
concrete indicators for implementation. Beyond these differences related to the resolution, both 
organizations differ in at least three other respects: (1) size and composition of membership 
(the EU currently comprises of 28 member states, while the OSCE counts 57 states from 
Europe, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Russia and North America); (2) approaches towards 
security (the OSCE’s concept of comprehensive security embraces not only a politico-military 
dimension, but also an economic and environmental as well as a human dimension, the latter 
including issues of human rights, tolerance and non-discrimination and challenging traditional 
notions of security undergirding the EU’s security and defense policy); and (3) varying 
opportunity structures of both organizations with that of the EU being more accessible for civil 
society actors than that of the OSCE. Given these institutional differences between the EU and 
the OSCE, we are interested in how they have shaped implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the 
security policies of both organizations.  
Drawing on conventional and feminist historical institutionalism, we argue that the different 
ways in which the EU and the OSCE engaged with UNSCR 1325 can be explained by their 
existing (gendered) institutional norms and rules and by the networks of gender advocates from 
within and outside the two organizations. Our findings add to the more general literature on 
gender-mainstreaming, which has paid scant attention to the domain of security. More 
specifically, they also contribute to the existing body of knowledge in this area, which has 
focused mainly on single case studies (e.g., Guerrina and Wright, 2016; Wright, 2016). Our 
comparison of the EU and the OSCE will provide insights into the scope conditions of gender-
mainstreaming—that is, the circumstances in which inserting gender into a less favorable 
policy domain becomes possible, and how this happens. 
Our exploration of norm implementation in the OSCE and the EU, at the policy as opposed to 
the field level, is based on a qualitative document analysis and on semi-structured interviews. 
With the aim to identify relevant events, policies and actors involved in the implementation of 
UNSCR 1325, we systematically reviewed all documents issued by EU and OSCE institutions, 
and by civil society actors, related to the process. Moreover, we conducted interviews between 
March 2009 and January 2016 with 14 individuals, selected on the basis of recommendations 
and of the information we obtained from the document analysis. They included four current 
and former OSCE officials, two EU officials, four civil society actors, three state 
representatives from Sweden and Germany and one representative of UN Women. The 
interviews helped not only to further reconstruct the implementation processes, but also to 
determine the role of different actors, their positions, the strategies they pursued and the 
constraints they faced. 
The article is structured as follows: First, we identify aspects of historical institutionalism that 
are relevant to our comparison of policy change in regional security organizations and discuss 
the added value a feminist lens can contribute to such a perspective. Drawing on these ideas 
and concepts, we then explore why the OSCE and the EU embraced UNSCR 1325 in different 
ways. After briefly describing the major differences between the relevant policies of the two 
organizations, we discuss specific reasons why their implementation paths diverged, such as 
the different composition of reform coalitions reflecting different formal and informal rules for 
external interaction, distinct policy legacies, and differences in the impact of decision-making 
structures as a result of varying extent of membership. We conclude with some reflections on 
theoretical and practical implications.  
 
2. Feminist historical institutionalism and change within international organizations 
Historical institutionalism (HI) is a particularly useful perspective to study change within 
international organizations. Not only does it go beyond the scope of rational choice 
institutionalism, which focuses primarily on the power and instrumental rationale of member 
states (e.g., Hawkins et al., 2006); it also exhibits more dynamism than the sociological strand 
of institutionalism that informs constructivist approaches focusing on bureaucracies of 
international organizations and their particular cultures (e.g., Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). 
HI helps us understand how institutions develop over time, under what conditions policy 
paradigms become embedded, and why political actors stick to institutional designs once they 
have invested in them (see Fioretos, 2011). It is precisely for these reasons that it is useful for 
investigating why the OSCE’s and the EU’s ways of implementing UNSCR 1325 diverge. 
Moreover, HI offers a notion of incremental change that conforms to how gender-
mainstreaming has been found to proceed. However, rather than drawing exclusively on HI, 
our analysis is also informed by its feminist variant, which ‘critiques and seeks to overcome 
the gender blindness of existing scholarship in the field’ and ‘responds to the considerable 
analytical strengths of [historical institutionalism] and the potential use of new institutionalist 
concepts and tools to help answer key questions of concern to feminist political scientists’ 
(Mackay, Kenny, and Chappell, 2010: 574). Feminist historical institutionalism shares many 
assumptions with its precursor, but also goes beyond conventional HI in at least one important 
respect—rather than viewing institutional norms and rules as neutral, feminist historical 
institutionalists regard them as inherently gendered. 
HI builds on the premise that institutional rules and norms agreed upon in the past develop 
path-dependent effects and will influence decisions and courses of events in the future. 
Proponents of the approach, most prominently Paul Pierson, explain path-dependence 
primarily by the dynamics of increasing returns and positive feedback. According to Pierson, 
these dynamics emerge when ‘the relative benefits of the current activity compared with other 
possible options increase over time’ and ‘the costs of exit—of switching to some previously 
plausible alternative—rise’ as a result (Pierson, 2000: 252), thus creating support for existing 
designs and resistance to change among constituencies. Organizations may even experience 
lock-in effects if ‘(i)nstitutions […] lock in balances of power or policy paradigms for lengthy 
periods of time and thus give those in privileged positions […] a stake in protecting extant 
designs’ (Fioretos, 2011: 377). In addition to vested interests, cognitive effects—such as 
learning, which leads to the continuance of established practices, and adapting expectations to 
the status quo—can contribute to the upholding of once established institutions (Zürn, 2016: 
209–210).  
Feminist historical institutionalists have called attention to the fact that institutions are 
inherently gendered. In their view, constructions of masculinity and femininity—that is, 
notions of how women and men are and should be, and what roles they should or should not 
assume—are embedded in the logics of political institutions, which constrain and shape social 
interaction (Mackay, Kenny, and Chappell, 2010: 580). These constructions manifest 
themselves in two ways: nominally, in the distribution of power between men and women, and 
substantively, through deeply embedded ideas of gender roles and relations. Historically, 
‘entrenched gender stereotypes and control of political resources have worked to privilege 
[certain] men and disadvantage most women’ (Chappell and Waylen, 2013: 602). This 
becomes particularly clear when considering the military and the police. Premised on gendered 
norms and practices, these security institutions are characterized by a reinforcement of 
paternalistic masculinities—men as protectors of allegedly powerless women and children—
and the exclusion of women (Sjoberg, 2013). Although the formal rules for women’s access to 
the police and the armed forces have changed practically everywhere and the numbers of 
women in these institutions have increased as a result, ‘norms related to masculinity remain 
embedded in the organizations and their practices and become a challenge for women’s 
inclusion and performance’ (Kronsell, 2016: 515).  
Gendered informal norms and rules that disadvantage women have proved to be persistent (or 
‘sticky,’ as historical institutionalists call it), despite attempts by feminist reformers to 
challenge them. They exist alongside and in conjunction with formal institutions and, according 
to feminist historical institutionalists, are the reason ‘changes to formal rules do not always 
mean that institutions act in ways designers anticipated or wanted, as informal norms, rules, 
and procedures are very powerful—particularly in terms of gender—and may undermine 
formal changes’ (Chappell and Waylen, 2013: 603).  
Because of this entrenched nature of institutions, change will often come incrementally. For 
example, organizations gradually replace old rules with new ones (displacement), add new 
rules to existing ones (layering), interpret and enact existing rules in new ways (conversion), 
or leave rules formally in place while still being faced with changes resulting from shifts in 
external conditions (drift) (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010: 15-18). According to historical 
institutionalists, more radical institutional change only results from exogenous shocks, or from 
what institutionalist scholars refer to as ‘critical junctures’ (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). In 
the absence of such events, incremental change may be initiated by reform coalitions. However, 
the success and achievements of such coalitions are shaped by existing formal and informal 
rules in the organization (Hanrieder, 2014; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Moschella and 
Vetterlein, 2014; Waylen, 2009).  
The importance of internal and external norm advocates as major drivers of change has been 
highlighted not only by HI but also by previous research on change within international 
organizations (e.g., Elgström, 2000; Park, 2006). One concept often discussed in the context of 
gender equality policy in the EU is Woodward’s feminist constellation of ‘velvet triangles,’ 
which consist of actors from ‘the organizations of the state, of civil society, and […] 
universities and consultancies’ (Woodward, 2003: 84) who constantly push for the introduction 
of gender into EU policy-making in a variety of domains (see also Woodward and van der 
Vleuten, 2014). Actors from organizations of the state include representatives of national 
governments and supranational institutions (i.e., of member states and the bureaucracy of the 
international organization), whereas the second and third groups include activists and experts 
from outside of the organization. The importance of external interaction is also addressed by 
proponents of both conventional and feminist HI. They emphasize that cooperation between 
internal reform coalitions and external actors is important. It allows new ideas and additional 
resources to access the policy process, which often leads to more substantial change (Hanrieder, 
2014; Moschella and Vetterlein, 2014; Waylen, 2009), whereas ‘[i]n the absence of external 
stimuli, the actors involved in the decision-making process tend to rely on what they know and 
on the instruments they have experience with’ (Moschella and Vetterlein, 2014: 151). Thus, it 
can be assumed that formal and informal rules that define an international organization’s degree 
of openness influence implementation processes, in that they facilitate access to the policy 
process for external actors from other international organizations, civil society, and academia.  
The strategies of reform coalitions and the outcomes they can achieve are shaped not only by 
the composition of reform coalitions and the opportunity structures which they faced in an 
organization, but also by existing policies, norms, and ideas. Feminist institutionalists have 
stressed that persistent gender norms and unequal power relations between women and men 
‘are part of the wider legacies and ongoing dynamics with which reform efforts must contend’ 
(Mackay, Kenny and Chappell, 2010: 585), which usually prevent transformative gender 
change. However, gendered institutional legacies do not always act as constraints, they can 
also provide opportunities. For instance, if policy environments are already relatively open to 
gender equality issues, they can enable reform coalitions to capitalize on the predominating 
political climate within the organization and use existing gender equality norms and policies to 
pursue their concerns (Waylen, 2009). Policy legacies, as our case studies will demonstrate, 
can impede change, but they can also be catalysts for new ideas, particularly when actors from 
within an organization maintain relationships with and engage in external networks.  
Finally, the institutional context can also manifest itself in decision-making rules, which 
determine the veto power of opponents to change (Hanrieder, 2014). Both of the organizations 
we examine here are subject to the consensus rule, which makes lock-in effects particularly 
likely to occur, considering that individual member states can obstruct change by blocking 
decisions. However, given the differences in membership between these organizations, which 
is more limited in the EU than in the OSCE, we would still expect this rule to play out 
differently. 
With these historical institutionalist concepts and assumptions in mind, we now turn to the 
comparison of the OSCE and the EU. Our analysis will illustrate how feminist reform coalitions 
in the two organizations prepared the ground for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 by 
working hard to overcome ‘sticky’ norms regarding women’s exclusion from areas of 
‘traditional’ security, such as police and military issues. However, the outcomes they achieved 
differed in several respects which, as we will show, can be convincingly explained with 
reference to existing institutional contexts: Different opportunity structures for external 
interaction, distinct gender policy legacies, and different memberships shaped and constrained 
change agents and change in the EU and the OSCE, and, thus, help us to identify scope 
conditions of gender-mainstreaming in regional security organizations. 
 
3. The different approaches of the OSCE and the EU to implement UNSCR 1325  
The approaches that the OSCE and the EU have chosen to integrate UNSCR 1325 into their 
security policies differ by type, scope, and dynamic. With reference to conceptualizations of 
incremental change within HI described above, we might interpret the OSCE’s approach as 
conversion that has become stagnant (or locked in), whereas the EU’s approach might be 
regarded as a form of layering, albeit one that has been both more comprehensive and specific, 
and that is still evolving.  
The way the OSCE implemented UNSCR 1325 can be characterized as a form of conversion 
that Mahoney and Thelen define as ‘changed enactment of existing rules due to their strategic 
redeployment’ (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010: 16). The OSCE primarily used its existing gender 
policy to implement UNSCR 1325. It had introduced its first Gender Action Plan in June 2000, 
a few months before UNSCR 1325 was adopted. Unlike in the case of the EU, gender had 
already been introduced into the organization’s security policy, yet its implementation was 
limited to the human dimension—that is, to issues of democratization and human rights. In the 
politico-military dimension, by contrast, gender activities had been a rare occurrence (see 
OSCE Annual Reports, 2000–2005). Even though the OSCE played an important role in 
broadening traditional concepts of security by adding a human dimension, prior to UNSCR 
1325 this did not go hand in hand with challenging traditional notions of gender in all 
dimensions. Overall, UNSCR 1325 had not received much attention until 2005. Although the 
OSCE acknowledged its adoption in its 2001 Annual Report and, in its second Gender Action 
Plan of 2004, urged member states to comply with it, it did not specify what exactly this would 
involve in terms of policy and practice.  
This tentative conversion process is reflected in the principal implementation document—the 
Ministerial Council Decision on women in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-
conflict rehabilitation adopted in 2005—which defines the primary objective as ‘(e)nsuring 
proactive implementation throughout the Organization of the 2004 OSCE Action Plan for the 
Promotion of Gender Equality’ (OSCE, 2005: Art. 1). Only secondary to this is the objective 
of ‘[i]ntegrating into the activities of the OSCE, as appropriate, the relevant parts of UN 
Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on the role of women in all levels of conflict 
prevention, crisis management and resolution, and post-conflict rehabilitation’ (Art. 2). The 
Decision includes seven articles that call on OSCE member states to increase the number of 
women in OSCE institutions and field missions, particularly in senior positions (Arts. 3–5); to 
promote women’s participation in peacebuilding initiatives and political processes, as well as 
in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict rehabilitation (Arts. 6–7); to 
consider women’s and girls’ important roles and particular needs when dealing with refugees 
and internally displaced persons (Art. 8); and to ‘regularly evaluate their efforts at gender 
mainstreaming in conflict prevention, conflict management, and rehabilitation processes’ 
(Art. 9). To varying degrees, these objectives had already been formulated in the OSCE’s 
second Gender Action Plan; the Ministerial Council Decision merely linked them more 
explicitly to the areas of conflict prevention, crisis management, and conflict rehabilitation, 
thus ‘converting’ them to align also with the politico-military dimension of the organization’s 
security policy.  
Following the Decision’s adoption, the OSCE launched a variety of gender activities in the 
politico-military dimension, including the appointment of a Gender Advisorii; the publication 
of handbooks and toolkits on gender and security sector reform, gender-responsive mediation, 
and internal oversight in the armed forces and the police; direct contributions to the 
development of National Action Plans in participating states; and trainings and support for 
national reform processes in the areas of women’s representation and gender-mainstreaming in 
the police, the army, and border security agencies (Ormhaug, 2014: 34–37; OSCE Annual 
Reports, 2005–2015). However, according to Lukatela (2016), the limited scope and specificity 
of the Ministerial Council Decision of 2005 provided a weak basis for the implementation of 
UNSCR 1325. As of yet, the existing policy framework has not been amended, despite calls 
from representatives from the OSCE and civil society at the OSCE Security Days event In 
Pursuit of Peace and Security: How Gender Makes a Difference in November 2015 to develop 
an ‘own action plan to integrate the Women, Peace and Security agenda more efficiently into 
the OSCE policies’ (OSCE, 2015: 7).  
The EU’s approach started from very different premises but has been more comprehensive, 
specific, and dynamic than that of the OSCE. The EU’s early gender equality policy initiatives 
in the 1970s and 1980s were limited to employment and the EU’s internal dimension. In the 
course of the policy’s expansion during the 1990s, gender issues received increasing attention 
in the EU’s external affairs, but with a special focus on development cooperation only. As a 
result, gender has mostly been an issue linked to the Common Market and to development 
assistance, areas in which the European Commission is a central player and in which until today 
most of the resources for gender equality issues are located (European Parliament, 2009: 43). 
The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), by contrast, has been characterized by a 
‘persistent invisibility of gender’ (Weiner and McRae, 2014), and it was not until 2006 that the 
Council responded to the continued appeals of the European Parliament to increase women’s 
participation in peaceful conflict resolution (European Parliament, 2000). 
Beginning in 2006, the EU, unlike the OSCE, introduced a new gender policy into its ESDP, 
thus layering ‘new rules on top of or alongside existing ones’ (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010: 15). 
In 2006, the Council issued a Check List to ensure gender mainstreaming and implementation 
of UNSCR 1325 in the planning and conduct of ESDP operations (Council of the European 
Union, 2006). Whereas this Checklist had been vague and noncommittal (Gya, 2007: 6), the in 
2008 adopted Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security (Council of the 
European Union, 2008) was much clearer and precise. The 43-page policy document 
envisioned a three-pronged strategy ‘to protect, support, and empower women in conflict’, 
calling on EU member states to ‘integrate women, peace and security issues in its [the EU’s] 
political and policy dialogue with partner governments, particularly of countries affected by 
armed conflict, in post conflict situations or situations of fragility’; to ‘mainstream a gender 
equality approach in its policies and activities, especially in the context of crisis management 
and in its long-term development cooperation’; and to ‘support specific strategic actions […] 
targeted at protecting, supporting and empowering women’ (Council of the European Union, 
2008: 11). The second point reveals the EU’s broader understanding of gender-mainstreaming 
in security particularly well. Whereas the OSCE’s Ministerial Council Decision focuses 
primarily on women’s participation, which is also reflected in the way its own gender policy 
was implemented (see, e.g., the OSCE Annual Reports, 2000–2015), the EU’s Comprehensive 
Approach identifies mainstreaming a gender equality perspective as an important goal. 
Moreover, it specifies a range of measures to implement UNSCR 1325 (and 1820), an effort 
that is completely absent in the OSCE’s document.  
The Council has adopted several strategies since 2008 that might be regarded as central to its 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 and as complementary to the Comprehensive Approach, in 
that they identify concrete steps for how to achieve gender-mainstreaming in the context of the 
ESDP. These steps include a set of Indicators for the Comprehensive Approach to the EU 
implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, 
peace and security (Council of the European Union, 2010), which were revised in 2016.iii In 
addition, the Comprehensive Approach established an Informal Task Force on UNSCR 1325, 
which meets regularly with the EU Special Representative on Human Rights, the Crisis 
Management and Planning Directorate, and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability of 
the European External Action Service (EEAS). It consists of members of the EEAS, the 
Council secretariat, and the Commission and is open to participation of member states and civil 
society organizations, which makes it an ‘important entry point for feminist advocacy’ 
(Guerrina and Wright, 2016: 304). Moreover, in 2015, the EEAS introduced the position of a 
Gender Advisor, although it should be noted that it did so after having resisted the creation of 
a Special Representative on Women, Peace, and Security (Guerrina and Wright, 2016: 310).  
As we have seen, the OSCE and the EU chose different approaches to implementing UNSCR 
1325. The OSCE adapted (or ‘converted’) its existing gender policy to a new policy area (i.e., 
that of ‘traditional’ politico-military security), selected a fairly limited approach to gender-
mainstreaming that was based primarily on women’s participation, and for quite some time 
now has experienced a ‘lock-in’ of this policy paradigm. The EU, by contrast, ‘layered’ a new 
gender-mainstreaming policy on top of existing ones in other policy areas and chose a more 
comprehensive and specific approach that has since been evolving. In the following section, 
we will draw on feminist HI to provide some explanations for these diverging implementation 
paths. 
 
4. Explanations for diverging implementation paths  
Feminist historical institutionalism helps us understand why the OSCE and the EU started to 
address UNSCR 1325, despite ‘sticky’ norms on women’s exclusion from ‘traditional’ 
security, and why the two organizations chose different approaches to implementing it. It draws 
attention to several factors: feminist reform coalitions, which were the main drivers behind the 
engagement with the resolution in both organizations; and specific institutional constraints, 
which produced path-dependent responses. Increasing participation of external actors in the 
EU’s reform coalition, which reflects different rules for external interaction, permitted the 
influx of new ideas into the process of implementing UNSCR 1325. This explains, at least in 
part, the larger scope of the EU’s approach. In comparison, the decision of the OSCE’s gender 
bureaucracy to stick to existing policy rather than introducing a new one as favored in the case 
of the ESDP, is the result of  distinct gender policy legacies which shaped the strategies of 
reform coalitions and member states’ responses to their demands in different ways . Finally, 
more open opposition to the integration of UNSCR 1325 in the OSCE and the prevailing 
consensus rule resulted in a lock-in of the OSCE’s policy framework, whereas  the 
implementation of the resolution in the EU was not hindered by veto players in this manner.  
 
4.1 Feminist reform coalitions, their composition, and rules for external interaction 
Feminist historical institutionalists have emphasized, and others have discussed with regard to 
the EU and the OSCE (Guerrina and Wright, 2016; Kronsell, 2016; Lukatela, 2016), that 
entrenched male power makes security institutions particularly resistant to gender equality. For 
this reason, feminist reform coalitions and individual change agents were necessary  for both 
organizations to address UNSCR 1325. However, the coalition in the EU differed from that in 
the OSCE. It included more external actors, among them NGOs, and therefore was more akin 
to a “‘velvet triangle”’ (Woodward, 2003), commonly seen as so important for gender equality 
change, than the coalition in the OSCE. The broader coalition in the EU is reflective of the fact 
that the organization has started to formally institutionalize contacts with NGOs and civil 
society organizations in the field of security (Dembinski and Joachim, 2014). .. Accordingly, 
the reform coalition in the EU included not only the European Parliament and individual 
member states, such as France and Slovenia, but also UN agencies, such as UNIFEM, and civil 
society actors.iv The latter particularly added momentum to the gender-mainstreaming of 
security and defense by pushing ‘the EU to the effective implementation of benchmarks for 
1325’ (European Parliament, 2010: 19), the development of indicators on sexual violence, and 
the continuation of ‘ongoing consultations already existing for a few years in the EU 
institutions with NGOs, civil society, and UN agencies’ (European Parliament, 2009: 42). Two 
civil society organizations assumed prominent roles in this respect. The International Security 
Information Service (ISIS) Europe, a research and advisory organization in the field of 
European and international security and defense, was commissioned by EU institutions to write 
reports, provided feedback on the implementation process, and offered recommendations. The 
European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), a platform for European NGOs, networks, 
and think tanks, acted as a clearing house that documented and provided information about EU 
policy initiatives and offered policy advice and specific recommendations.v 
In addition, the network of gender entrepreneurs in the EU was joined by prominent individuals 
who were members of different networks themselves and who were akin to the ‘change agents’ 
that Woodward and van der Vleuten regarded as crucial in the promotion of ‘gender equality 
norms and practices’ in the EU more generally (Woodward and van der Vleuten, 2014: 76). 
Margot Wallström might be regarded as such an entrepreneur and ‘active broker.’ She travelled 
between, and was familiar with, both the EU and the UN because of her previous appointment 
as EU Commissioner for Environment and, later, UN Special Representative on Sexual 
Violence in Conflict. She frequently attended EU meetings and consultations with Council and 
Commission staff and with civil society organizations devoted to issues related to gender and 
armed conflict (see European Parliament, 2010: 10). According to a report for the European 
Parliament, ‘Wallström decided to work […] in a proactive direction and provided, via a newly 
established Team of Legal Experts, international assistance to institutional and capacity 
building’ (European Parliament, 2010: 16). She also called for a ‘Personal (EU) Advisor to act 
as a Personal Interlocutor’ to her role (European Parliament, 2010: 48).  
Another important change agent in the EU was Brigadier General Karl Engelbrektsson. As a 
member of the Swedish Armed Forces, a former commander of the Nordic Battle Groups, and 
the Swedish representative to the EU Military Committee, Engelbrektsson was ‘a strong voice 
in the military for 1325 to become a natural approach to EU policy implementation’ (European 
Parliament, 2010: 62) and a promoter of gender coaching for head of missions (European 
Parliament, 2010: 62). However, the EU’s openness and receptiveness to external actors such 
as Wallström and Engelbrektsson, as well as to the UN and civil society organizations, can be 
explained not only by access rules but also by the lack of in-house expertise on how to include 
gender-mainstreaming into security policy.vi 
In contrast to the EU, in the OSCE,  despite gradual improvement of opportunity structures for 
NGOs since the 1990s, with NGOs now being able to attend most official OSCE meetings, 
‘there have been no successful attempts to entrench formal access, nor do they seem likely’ 
(Squatrito, Sommerer, and Tallberg, 2016: 187). As a consequence, civil society organizations 
have not really been part of the reform coalition that shaped OSCE policy on the resolution. 
The gender bureaucracy in Vienna involved NGOs only occasionally, through invitations to 
events related to the issue and in the context of specific projects concerning the development 
of UNSCR 1325 National Action Plans in participating states in which the independent 
research foundation Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and the international NGO Inclusive 
Security took part as project partners (Ormhaug, 2014; OSCE and Inclusive Security, 2016).vii 
The OSCE had already developed its own internal gender bureaucracy before it implemented 
UNSCR 1325 and apparently did no longer regard external gender expertise as necessary.  
The UNSCR 1325 reform coalition in the OSCE consisted mainly of internal actors, with the 
Swedish delegation leading the way by initiating the Ministerial Council Decision in 2005 and, 
since 2011, funding the separate Gender Advisor within the OSCE Secretariat responsible for 
gender equality issues within the politico-military dimension. This Adviser, Swedish herself, 
became one of the major drivers behind the implementation of UNSCR 1325 within the 
organization. The Swedish delegation was supported by the Vice-President and Special 
Representative for Gender Issues of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (and former Vice-
Chairperson of the Defense Committee of the Swedish Parliament), the Folke Bernadotte 
Academy (a Swedish government agency for peace, security, and development), and a few 
other OSCE delegations.  
The leadership of Swedish actors in both organizations can be explained by Sweden’s strong 
gender-mainstreaming agenda and policies on the domestic level. The Swedish government, 
for instance, was one of the first governments to adopt a national gender action plan concerning 
UNSCR 1325, it worked with civil society organizations and the military to develop 
mechanisms for more inclusion of gender issues in peacekeeping missions, and made achieving 
equality of women and men a fundamental aim of its foreign policy.viii Supporting the 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the OSCE and the EU was an important part of this agenda.  
 
4.2 Distinct gender policy legacies 
The reform coalitions in the OSCE and the EU encountered distinct gender policy legacies that 
shaped their strategies and member states’ responses in different ways, and thus produced path-
dependent effects in both organizations.  
In the OSCE, the already existing gender policy and different understandings of gender issues 
and UNSCR 1325 had lasting effects on the integration of the resolution. The fact that a gender 
policy was already in place led many policy-makers within the OSCE to believe that their 
organization did not need UNSCR 1325. According to some of our interviewees, many 
government officials from participating states did not understand why yet ‘another’ gender 
policy would be needed. In addition, many officials insisted that gender issues were a matter 
of the human dimension of security—that is, of democracy and human rights—rather than a 
matter of the politico-military sphere, a view that reflected the then established practice of 
implementing the existing gender policy almost exclusively in the human dimension of the 
OSCE’s security policy. Many also considered the resolution to be a UN policy on 
peacekeeping that was irrelevant to the OSCE’s activities, which focus primarily on post-
conflict situations and do not include military operations.ix Our findings, based on what 
interviewees told us, suggest that the preferences of many participating states to continue 
established practices can be explained by cognitive effects, such as ‘learned’ practices and 
understandings, rather than vested interests in established designs and turf wars within the 
organization.  
For this reason, the then OSCE Gender Advisor adapted her approach to the resolution 
accordingly. She preferred to introduce UNSCR 1325 into the OSCE with reference to the 
organization’s existing concept of comprehensive security by extending gender from the 
human to the politico-military dimension, instead of trying to set up a separate policy for 
UNSCR 1325.x This way of thinking was reflected in the organization’s second Gender Action 
Plan, which suggested extending the comprehensive security approach to include gender based 
on the idea that ‘[g]ender equality contributes to comprehensive security, which is a goal of 
OSCE activities in all three dimensions’ (OSCE, 2004: para. 3), and that ‘[t]he empowerment 
of women in the political-military dimension is also essential to comprehensive security’ 
(para. 44e). In a background paper published later, the organization explained that ‘the OSCE 
has adopted some of the provisions of UNSCR 1325 directly, [while] “customizing” others to 
its specific mandate and its comprehensive approach on security’ (OSCE, 2010: 1). 
The ESDP did not have a gender policy prior to the adoption of UNSCR 1325. Therefore, the 
reform coalition did not encounter arguments from member states similar to those in the OSCE. 
However, it drew on already existing gender policies in fields other than security to make a 
case for the new policy on UNSCR 1325. Feminist historical institutionalism reminds us that 
it is the institutional substrate that enables organizations to differentiate themselves from others 
in the first place, or as Koops puts it, ‘to build up [their] own image, identity, and reputation’ 
(2012: 174). The high degree of institutionalization of gender allowed the EU to distinguish 
itself from other organizations, with UNSCR 1325 being considered as a means to ‘improve 
EU visibility’ (Council of the European Union, 2010: 7). Several internal documents support 
this finding, including a study prepared by Sherriff and Barnes for the Slovenian Presidency in 
which the EU and its member states are referred to as being ‘amongst the most progressive […] 
in the world when it comes to gender,’ and the EU is viewed as distinct from other organizations 
because of its ‘commitment to and progress on gender equality and human rights’ in policy 
fields such as development’ (Sherriff and Barnes, 2008: 4). This case illustrates that previously 
agreed upon policies and firmly established institutions do not only shape implementation, they 
can also drive change.  
 
4.3 Same decision-making rule—different influence resulting from different extent of 
membership 
Lastly, the influence of decision-making rules explains the less dynamic approach in the OSCE, 
albeit in a different way than the literature suggests (Hanrieder, 2014). What distinguishes the 
OSCE and the ESDP is not the rule itself—after all, consensus decisions are required in both 
cases—but the way in which it becomes effective as a result of the varying extent of 
membership. Whereas in the case of the EU, individual states such as Sweden, France, or 
Slovenia saw the inclusion of gender in the ESDP as an opportunity to raise the organization’s 
profile and set it apart from the UN, the OSCE’s wider membership, and especially the veto of 
member states that are less in favor of UNSCR 1325, appear to have restricted the 
implementation of UNSCR 1325. One important veto player is Russia, whose Permanent 
Representative, for instance, stated that ‘it should not be forgotten that Resolution 1325 is 
applicable only in certain situations, and therefore we cannot agree with its excessive 
promotion in the OSCE and especially its extremely broad interpretation. We take the position 
that the leading role in this regard should remain with the United Nations’ (OSCE Delegation 
of the Russian Federation, 2016: 2). Since 2014, the Russian Delegation has blocked several 
attempts to negotiate an action plan on the women, peace, and security agenda (Lukatela, 2016: 
53), most ‘likely linked to the utility it sees in using gender equality to push back against the 
overall human rights agenda and the human dimension work where it encroaches on Russian 
interests’ (Lukatela, 2016: 57). These vested interests have blocked progress related to UNSCR 
1325 in the OSCE. We could not detect dynamics of this kind in the EU.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The comparison of the ways in which the OSCE and the EU introduced UNSCR 1325 into their 
security policies has revealed interesting similarities and differences. In response to efforts 
from reform coalitions, both organizations started to engage with the resolution, but they 
pursued different paths toward its implementation. The OSCE’s approach resembles an 
incremental conversion of its existing gender policy, which has since been ‘locked in’ because 
of opposition under the prevailing consensus rule. The EU’s approach, on the other hand, can 
be likened to a layering-on of a new, comparatively comprehensive and specific policy 
alongside existing gender policies in other policy areas.  
Conventional and feminist historical institutionalism help to make sense of the different 
responses of the two organizations by drawing attention to entrenched norms and rules, some 
of them gendered, the activities of feminist reform coalitions, and the constraining and enabling 
factors with which these coalitions are faced. In the case of the OSCE, gender policy legacies 
proved to be relatively change-resistant because there was little interaction between internal 
and external change agents and opposition from individual participating states. In the case of 
the EU, gender policy legacies, in combination with formal and informal rules related to 
external interaction, benefited the reform coalition and facilitated the adoption of the more 
specific and dynamic Comprehensive Approach. 
These are important findings, both in theoretical and practical terms. As regards theory, they 
lend themselves to further research on gender-mainstreaming in security organizations. In this 
study, we focused primarily on implementation at the policy level, but it would also be of 
importance to examine how well the factors we have identified travel across different levels 
and, for example, influence implementation into practices at the level of field missions and 
operations. Also, what role do these factors play in other regional security organizations, such 
as NATO where UNSCR 1325 has started to take a hold as well (Wright, 2016)? With respect 
to the implications for policy, there is reason for gender advocates to be cautiously optimistic. 
While previous exposure of institutions to gender may not guarantee the success of gender-
mainstreaming activities, support from external actors can help to overcome internal opposition 
and equality-adverse gender norms and rules. Even in cases where internal opposition is 
currently blocking substantial change, external support may help internal gender advocates to 
work creatively around such opposition and implement piecemeal changes that contribute over 
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